

give such gambling Congressional consent. The bill sends exactly the wrong message to the public about sports gambling and threatens to undermine the integrity of American sports.

On a related point, we believe the Congress should not consider any liberalization of Internet gambling until the U.S. Trade Representative successfully resolves our trade disputes in this area. A rush to judgment on this subject could result in irreversible damage to U.S. sovereignty in the area of gambling regulation, including the capacity to prohibit sports bets.

Though Internet gambling on sports has never been legal, easy access to offshore Internet gambling web sites has created the opposite impression among the general public, particularly before Congress enacted UIGEA last fall. UIGEA emerged from more than a decade of Congressional consideration, in which stand-alone legislation aimed at restricting Internet gambling passed either the Senate or the House in each of five successive Congresses, each time by overwhelming bi-partisan votes. UIGEA also enjoyed a broad array of supporters, including 49 state Attorneys General and other law enforcement associations, several major financial institutions and technology companies, dozens of religious and family organizations, and of course our sports organizations.

Enactment of UIGEA was grounded on concerns about addictive, compulsive, and underage Internet gambling, unlawful sports betting, potential criminal activity, and the wholesale evasion of federal and state laws. When it passed the House a year ago, the vote was 317-93, including majorities of both caucuses and with the affirmative votes of both party leaders.

The final product was a law that did not change the legality of any gambling activity—it simply gave law enforcement new, effective tools for enforcing existing state and federal gambling laws. UIGEA and its predecessor bills could attract such consensus because they adhered to this principle: whether you think gambling liberalization is a bad idea or a good one, the policy judgments of State legislatures and Congress must be respected, not de facto repealed by deliberate evasion of the law by offshore entities via the Internet.

By contrast, H.R. 2046 would put the Treasury Department in charge of issuing licenses to Internet gambling operators, who would then be immunized from prosecution or liability under any Federal or State law that prohibits what the Frank bill permits. The bill would tear apart the fabric of American gambling regulation. By overriding in one stroke dozens of Federal and State gambling laws, this would amount to the greatest expansion of legalized gambling ever enacted.

This legislation contains an “opt-out” that appears to permit individual leagues to prohibit gambling on their sports. But regardless of the “opt-out,” the bill breaks terrible new ground, because Congress would for the first time sanction sports betting. That is reason enough to oppose it. In addition, the bill’s safeguard opt-out for sports leagues as well as the one for states may well prove illusory and ineffectual. They will be subject to legal challenge before U.S. courts and the World Trade Organization.

In addition, this legislation would dramatically complicate current trade negotiations concerning gambling. In 1994, the United States signed the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which included a commitment to free trade in “other recreational services.” In subsequent WTO proceedings, the United States has claimed this commitment never included gambling services. The United States has noted that any such “commitment” would contradict a host of federal

and state laws that regulate and restrict gambling. The WTO has not accepted this argument.

Accordingly, the U.S. Trade Representative has initiated negotiations to withdraw gambling from U.S. GATS commitments. Before withdrawal can be finalized, agreement must be reached on trade concessions with interested trading partners. Few concessions should be required because there was never a legal market in Internet gambling in the U.S. If Congress creates a legal market before withdrawal is complete, the withdrawal will become much more complicated and costly. Therefore, we oppose any legislation that would imperil the withdrawal process.

Finally, we have heard the argument that Internet gambling can actually protect the integrity of sports because of the alleged capacity to monitor gambling patterns more closely in a legalized environment. This argument is generally asserted by those who would profit from legalized gambling and the same point was raised in 1992 when PASPA was enacted. Congress dismissed it then and should dismiss it now. The harms caused by government endorsement of sports betting far exceed the alleged benefits.

H.R. 2046 sets aside decades of federal precedent to legalize sports betting and exposes American gambling laws to continuing jeopardy in the WTO. We strongly urge that you oppose it. Thank you for considering our views on this matter.

Sincerely,

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#### DARFUR

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, genocide has only one morally tenable answer. This week, the United Nations found that answer: decisive and forceful action to protect the innocent. Tuesday’s Security Council resolution put real teeth in the world’s effort to stop the Darfur genocide: A paltry contingent of 7,000 African Union peacekeepers will swell with 26,000 more troops in a combined UN/AU force.

The peacekeepers will take command of the region by the end of the year, and their arms will help to shield the people of Darfur from continued murder and rape and displacement.

I applaud this resolution. We all know that it comes 450,000 lives too late. But the UN’s action looks positively instantaneous when set against the delay and the equivocation of our own Government. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios assured the world that American action was “imminent” 7

months ago. And it was 2 years ago that President Bush declared the crimes in Darfur “genocide.”

But there is still time for America to act, and a vital role for America to play. The Security Council’s force resolution, as valuable as it is, came at a price: To mollify China and several African member states, its provisions for multilateral sanctions on Sudan were significantly softened. We can, and must, fill the gap with unilateral sanctions of our own.

Multilateral force combined with American sanctions would show the international system working at its best. The world community has agreed to act against genocide; now, the United States can work in the spirit of that resolution and do its own part to bring the suffering to an end. Our economic muscle can be a potent weapon.

Three sanctions bills are before the Senate. Two S. 831—the Sudan Divestment Authorization Act of 2007, and S. 1563, the Sudan Disclosure and Enforcement Act of 2007—have been authored by my friend and colleague, Senator DURBIN. From the very start, his voice has been the strongest in the Senate on the Darfur genocide, and his tremendous leadership stands in stark contrast to this administration.

A third sanctions bill—H.R. 180, the Darfur Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007—has been authored by Representative BARBARA LEE, whose leadership ranks with Senator DURBIN’s. I have asked the majority leader to expedite consideration of all of these bills.

I would like to focus for a moment on Representative LEE’s bill. It aims to punish the bloodstained Government of Sudan by assisting divestment from companies that—knowingly or not—have helped to fund the genocide. H.R. 180 requires the Department of the Treasury to develop a list of companies investing in specific sectors of the Sudanese economy: power production, mineral extraction, oil-related industries, and military equipment industries.

Before being put on the list, companies are given 30 days to either rebut the designation or to say that they will be suspending such activities within a year. The bill also removes specific legal barriers to enable mutual fund and corporate pension fund managers to cut ties with these listed companies.

And it allows States and localities to divest their public pension funds from those companies whose financial operations help support the genocidal practices of the Sudanese Government.

In ultimately leading to the withdrawal of funds from the Sudanese military machine, the bill does valuable work. But I am concerned that it entrusts the compilation of the list of companies to the wrong agency, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control. OFAC is an enforcement agency, and such investigation is not in its mission.

I believe the job is better entrusted to an interagency task force combining

the varied strengths of the Departments of Treasury, State, and Energy, along with the SEC. This combined approach will mean that our efforts toward divestment are as fair, effective, targeted, and transparent as they can be. So I have proposed amending the divestment bill to that effect; a second amendment authorizes \$2 million to make this divestment task force a reality.

But whatever form they take, sanctions need to pass now. As the UN/AU force stabilizes Darfur, we must do our utmost to choke off the money that has oiled the machinery of slaughter. To those of my colleagues who are standing in the way of swift action, I ask:

What more do you need to see?

What more do we need to prove?

What more could it possibly take to move you?

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 180, as amended, and the two other strong Senate bills.

#### CROP INSURANCE

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, my comments here today are to point out the importance of the crop insurance program to America's farmers and America's rural communities.

Congress enacted legislation in 1980 that allowed for the expansion of the program and the involvement of the private insurance sector in the crop insurance program's delivery. Since this time, the program has grown from a small, experimental program to one that insures over 70 percent of the eligible acres in the country. In many States, an even higher percentage of the eligible acres in the State are insured. In my home State of Iowa we have over 90 percent enrollment. This protection has come to be relied on by farmers and their lenders as a vital and necessary part of farming. For most farmers their crop insurance policy is the basis of their risk management, crop marketing and loan collateral.

The success of the crop insurance program can be attributed to two key items. One is the support of the Federal Government. It is no secret that the Government supports the crop insurance program with premium subsidies that encourage farmers to purchase coverage and help pay for its cost. Additionally, rather than further increasing farmers' premium costs, the Government also pays for the delivery of the program. These Government expenditures, while not insignificant, are considerably less than the Government would likely spend in after-the-fact disaster aid if farmers didn't use the program or if the program didn't exist.

The second key item that has contributed to the success of the crop insurance program is the delivery of the program by the private insurance sector. Delivery of the crop insurance program by private companies, using local insurance agents, using modern technology, and with an incentive to do

things right and earn underwriting rewards, has allowed for market penetration that was thought impossible by many. But it has occurred, and it continues due to the quality, timely and accurate service being provided to farmers by local agents and companies.

I point out the importance of this program and its successes today, because this body is expected to consider this program during debate of the farm bill. It appears that despite successfully operating under separate legislation for years, the crop insurance program is being pulled into the farm bill discussions. The House farm bill has pulled money from the crop insurance program to offset other spending. I intend to analyze carefully the impact this House action will have on farmer's ability to manage their own risk. While I recognize there are improvements that need to be made to the program, crop insurance brings more stability to rural America.

American farmers deserve a safety net that they can count on each and every crop year. As the Senate prepares to work on our farm bill provisions, I hope we recognize that crop insurance has become ingrained into the fiber of American agriculture, from the farmers and lenders that depend on it to the rural communities whose local economies are bolstered by it in hard times.

#### BALLOT INTEGRITY ACT

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to address an important development in the way our votes are counted. Last November, California elected a new chief election officer—Secretary of State Debra Bowen. Secretary Bowen served in the California Legislature, where she had a reputation as a dedicated advocate for greater protections of our voting systems. Upon becoming secretary of state, she called for a “top-to-bottom” review of all voting systems used in California. This was a dynamic and appropriate step, given the heartburn that electronic voting systems have caused voters nationwide.

The problems with paperless voting systems are clear. Computers are no substitute for a paper record. We want to know where our most important documents are—and we don't leave them on the computer. Votes should be no different.

Many events over the last few years have raised great concerns about paperless voting systems. In a congressional race in Sarasota, FL, about 18,000 ballots had no recorded vote. The final vote count divided the candidates by only 300-odd votes. So-called “under-votes” occur in every election. But the rate in Florida's 13th Congressional District was unusually high. And because there was no verified paper record, we may never know who really won that election.

Some say paper ballots can malfunction or be manipulated just as easily as

these computers. I strongly disagree. When paper records fail, we can see that they have failed. If paper records are stolen, or disappear, we will notice their absence. But when malfunctions or security gaps occur in paperless voting systems, there is no easy way for voters or election officials to know that something has gone wrong. It is for this reason I support optical scan paper systems—or, at minimum, voting systems that produce a paper record verified by the voter.

So it is entirely appropriate that Secretary Bowen performed this test. Californians go to the polls in 6 months to cast their votes in the presidential primary. They must have confidence in their voting systems. With the cooperation of several voting system vendors, the University of California assembled several teams to review the systems. The teams examined the systems' source code, their physical and software defenses, and the ability of people with disabilities to use these systems. The systems fell short in all three tests. In a short span of time, computer scientists identified a number of major vulnerabilities with the voting systems. And these experts were able to hack the vote in less than 5 weeks.

It is important to note that many election officials employ security measures to protect their systems from these kinds of attacks. In this test, the focus was on the voting system's defenses alone—no external protections were employed. Even without such protections, the results of this examination clearly indicate we need to improve these systems.

A few examples of what the University of California experts were able to do: First, researchers were able to gain access to the internal computer system by breaking or bypassing the locks in the voting systems. In the case of one voting system, ordinary office objects were used to gain access. Second, researchers were able to replace existing software with a new, corrupt virus that fed incorrect election data to the system. This attack used a program that appeared to change the text, but instead replaced the original software with corrupted code. Many small jurisdictions may lack the technical ability to identify and protect against these attacks. Third, while election officials can test these systems, experts noted that software distinguishes between election mode and testing mode. This could allow a virus to instruct the system to run properly during a test—but allow it to be corrupted during an election. Even counties that test their systems often could be vulnerable. Finally, the team was able to develop a device that would allow unauthorized access—and allow someone wishing to corrupt the ballot box to change the system's vote count.

What does all this mean for elections in the United States?

It means we should follow the lead of Secretary Bowen, and take a very